Price-Capping regulation as a protectionist strategy in developing countries by Lawrence, Peter & Arijit Mukherjee
 1











Abstract: In developing countries undergoing liberalising economic reforms, there are 
typically local incumbents facing the loss of protection.  Strategic lobbying by such firms 
for a price-capping regulatory regime is, under certain conditions, one way in which they 
can deter entry by competitors who are likely to be foreign firms. We show that a 
regulatory price can be set such that the net profit of the entrant is lower than the entry 
cost thus deterring entry. We then show that it is possible for the profit of the incumbent 
to be greater under regulation which deters entry than under unregulated duopoly. 
Counter-intuitively, we further discover that lobbying for regulation is to be expected 
where the incumbent firm is relatively cost-efficient. We also consider the case of 
multiple incumbents threatened by entry. We observe a co-ordination problem and 
consider the possibility of co-operation in lobbying. We then show that such co-
operation, if possible, is always preferable to non-co-operation. We also extend our 
analysis to incorporate the possibility of lobbying by the entrant and show the importance 
of the cost of lobbying and the probability of successful lobbying by the incumbent.  
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1 Introduction 
Liberal economic reforms in developing countries have resulted in the removal by 
governments of various protectionist measures such as licensing, subsidies and other 
barriers to foreign direct investment (FDI), in order to encourage open competition either 
through imports or entry by foreign competitors. Domestic incumbents can engage in 
various strategies to cope with potential competitors among which are joint ventures or 
licensing agreements, often designed to acquire the advanced technology necessary to 
produce competitive goods. We are concerned with a less obvious strategy for deterring 
entry: lobbying of governments by the incumbent firm or firms for a price-capping 
regulatory regime. 
We proceed by setting out the background and discussing previous work on the 
subject and especially recent modelling of situations under which firms might prefer 
regulation to deter entry. We then model the behaviour of two firms, an incumbent and an 
entrant, first in a situation of no regulation and then under price-capping regulation. We 
show in the first case that with no incumbent lobbying for a price-cap and with positive 
profits for the entrant, entry will occur. In the second case, we show that a regulatory 
price can be set such that the net profit of the entrant is lower than the entry cost thus 
deterring entry. We then show that it is possible for the profit of the incumbent to be 
greater under regulation which deters entry than under unregulated duopoly. Counter-
intuitively, we further discover that lobbying for regulation is to be expected where the 
incumbent firm is relatively cost-efficient. We extend the model to consider the case of 
multiple incumbents threatened by entry. We observe a co-ordination problem in that 
firms may try to free ride other firms’ lobbying costs. We consider the possibility of co-
operation in lobbying by multiple incumbents and show that such co-operation, if 
possible, is always preferable to non-co-operation. We further extend the model to 
consider the case where the incumbent lobbies for regulation and the entrant lobbies for 
non-regulation. Here we find that the equilibrium strategy will crucially depend on the 
relationship between the cost of lobbying and the probability of successful lobbying by 
the incumbent.  3
This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 sets out the background and 
motivation of the paper, considering previous research on price regulation and noting the 
difference between the model presented here and other related models. Section 3 sets out 
the basic model with one incumbent and one entrant and presents the results. Section 4 
extends the model to the case of multiple incumbents. Section 5 extends the model to the 
case where entrants can lobby. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2  Background and Motivation 
One of the principal arguments for trade liberalisation in developing countries is that 
competition from importing goods gives an incentive to domestic producers to reduce 
costs and thereby increase welfare. Such competition also gives domestic firms an 
incentive to engage in research and development in order to improve the quality of their 
products to competitive standards, once again increasing the general level of welfare. 
Rather than export goods to such markets, foreign firms might decide to set up production 
units in such countries and compete directly. Domestic firms under trade liberalisation are 
no longer able to keep such firms out because, typically, licensing systems which favour 
domestic firms no longer exist. Such incumbent firms need to find other strategies to 
maintain their position.  
In at least the semi-industrialised developing economy case there are typically 
local incumbents, which are either monopolies or oligopolies, and in the transitional 
economies former state-owned monopolies. They will have enjoyed various kinds of 
protection – import controls, licensing, tariffs – but now face the certainty under 
liberalisation policies that competitive products will be sold on their previously protected 
markets.  They also face the possibility that new, usually foreign, firms will enter, almost 
certainly with higher levels of technology and productivity. Local firms have several 
advantages over foreign firms. They have better knowledge of local institutions – 
government, finance, and the legal system. They have long experience of operating in 
local labour markets. Foreign firms face costs of acquisition of local knowledge and in 
dealing with government, as well as local capital and labour markets. However, they 
possess the more advanced technology. Local firms may meet such foreign competition  4
by co-operating in joint ventures or by buying the licences to import advanced technology 
from foreign firms. 
Empirical studies bear out part of this story.  Patibandla (2002) shows how in 
India the incumbent firms have increased their technical efficiency in order to compete 
successfully with the foreign entrants. They are less responsive in changing their 
organisational structures, but the efficiency losses from not doing this are outweighed by 
the greater knowledge they have of local institutions and markets. Entrants are still able to 
increase market share on the back of promotional expenditures, but they have relatively 
high entry costs in acquiring market information. However their market share can be 
limited by local competition from incumbents. This could deter market entry where set up 
costs are high and require large scale outputs, though new entrants are found to overcome 
this difficulty by exporting output which is surplus to domestic market requirements.   
The implications for theory of this analysis are that foreign entry works to raise 
the technical level of incumbent firms, and, allowing for informational asymmetries, 
competition works in the way liberalisation theory suggests it should. Of course, it is easy 
to envisage a longer run case where foreign entry backed by superior technology, and 
established locally long enough to acquire knowledge of local markets and institutions, 
corners these markets and causes the demise of local firms, or takes them over.  But local 
markets are not the only ones open to all the players. Increased access to export markets is 
considered to be a major benefit deriving from foreign participation in local 
manufacturing. Indeed it might be expected that foreign owned firms, or local affiliates of 
foreign owned firms, will operate at a higher level of technology thus allowing them to 
compete in export markets. However, Aggarwal (2002) finds that this is only true of low-
tech sectors: in medium and high-tech sectors, local firms perform as well in export 
markets as do foreign affiliates. So competition does work to some extent, but not to the 
extent that high-tech entrants or incumbents who have converted to high-tech, emerge as 
the dominant force. One conclusion of Aggarwal’s analysis is that high-tech foreign firms 
require a local infrastructure including a highly skilled labour force, to give them 
sufficient incentive to engage in advanced manufacturing. However this does not prevent 
new entry in lower-tech sectors.  5
Given that there are likely to be few such firms in even relatively industrialised 
developing and transitional economies – indeed in the latter they are likely to be 
privatised state monopoly enterprises - they are likely to want to maintain their 
monopolistic or oligopolistic position. The factors that currently deter foreign entry may 
not always exist. Such firms are likely to look for other ways to keep out foreign 
competition. One possibility is that they lobby for continued protection. The degree to 
which they are successful will depend on how far politicians respond to the lobbies. 
Brainard and Verdier (1994) have shown that where the gains to firms from lobbying are 
greater than those from adjustment, current protection is an increasing function of past 
protection. They have also shown that by making lobbies pay a fixed cost in order to be 
able to pay variable lobbying costs, it is possible that they adjust rather than seek 
continued protection Brainard and Verdier, 1997). 
Other possibilities of incumbent firms’ deterring entry emerges from recent 
literature on regulation. In a study of local telecommunications regulation in the US, 
Koski and Majumdar (2002) have shown that incumbent firms have responded to 
regulation by various strategies (such as increased advertising and where possible, 
increased access charges), that deter entry.  Michaelis (1994) has pointed to the possibility 
of gains from regulation depending on firm’s cost structures. He has further modelled the 
behaviour of firms with respect to political party contributions in strategic lobbying for 
regulation. Most recently, Iozzi (2001) has shown that under dynamic price cap 
regulation, the firm (in this case a monopolist) can successfully deter entry by committing 
itself to a sufficiently low price at the beginning, and therefore in the future, such that the 
fixed costs of entry are too high relatively to the prices which can be charged.   
As Iozzi observes, the previous literature he reviews is concerned with the 
possibility that strategic pricing, in conditions where there is dynamic fixing of prices 
under regulatory regimes, has the objective of ‘softening’ the price constraint in the 
longer run.  Iozzi departs from that literature by considering a firm under entry threat, and 
by showing that such a firm follows a strategy of ‘tightening’ the price regime over time 
in order to deter the threat of entry.  The policy implication here is that the regulatory 
regime should prevent such a strategy in order to encourage entry.   6
Iozzi’s analysis begs the question of why competition is necessary if the firm and 
the regulatory regime together produce a result that gives lower prices and therefore 
increased consumer welfare, though Iozzi does not consider welfare effects.  One could 
go even further to ask why it is necessary to incur costs of regulation. The theory of 
contestable markets suggests that the existence of guaranteed free entry and the credible 
threat of entry together maintain a competitive price regime (Bailey, 1981; Baumol et al, 
1982).  Why worry about freedom of entry and the existence of competition if their 
welfare benefits can be obtained by other means? In the Iozzi case, a regulatory regime 
with long-term credibility will suffice to prevent backsliding. In the contestable markets 
case, the threat of entry has to be credible and persistent.  One answer to the above 
question is that incumbents are able to sell at prices which effectively include the excess 
set up costs of the potential entrant resulting from information asymmetries and the like.  
Competition on a level playing field would eliminate these costs and cause market prices 
to fall to marginal cost.  Keeping out competitors maintains profits at higher than 
competitive level. 
   The price-capping agreement in Iozzi’s model is one case of the incumbent (a 
monopolist) using the regulatory regime to deter entry. In the semi-industrialised 
developing country case, with existing firms finding themselves in a previously protected 
and now liberalised market, a price-capping regime could have advantages in deterring 
the entry of foreign competitor firms. Here, we combine the issues of regulation and 
strategic lobbying to consider is the case of one or more firms lobbying government to 
introduce a regulatory price-capping regime, which both deters foreign entry and 
increases the level of domestic welfare. Under well-specified conditions, price-capping 
could have the paradoxical effect of protecting the position of incumbent firms against 
foreign investors and slowing some of the classic benefits of liberalisation. 
  At this point it is worth mentioning the difference between this paper and others 
mentioned here, especially Iozzi (2001) and Michaelis(1994). First, unlike Iozzi (2001), 
we endogenize the decision on regulation. Secondly, we extend the analysis to the case of 
multiple incumbents and show the possibility of a free-rider problem and the role of co-
operation between the incumbents. Thirdly, we assume that in the post-entry game the  7
firms choose their outputs simultaneously while, Iozzi (2001) assumes that the firms 
choose prices in the output market and the incumbent firm acts as a price leader in the 
product market. Finally, we allow asymmetry between firms in their cost structure while 
Iozzi (2001) does not. A key difference between this paper and that of Michaelis (1994) is 
that our result holds even if the incumbent is cost-inefficient. 
 
3  The model and results 
Consider an economy with two firms, called incumbent and entrant. The incumbent firm 
is already in the market and has incurred the sunk cost of entry. However, the entrant has 
to decide whether to enter the market or not. In the case of entry, the entrant needs to 
incur a sunk cost, K . 
We make the following assumption for the production technology of these firms. 
The incumbent and the entrant produce a homogenous product with constant marginal 
cost of production  i c  and  e c  respectively. We do not make any restriction on the 
superiority of the production technology of the incumbent and the entrant. Hence, we will 
conduct our analysis where  e i c c >=< . For simplicity, we only assume that the marginal 
costs are such that both firms produce a positive output whenever they enter the market. 
As another simplification, we assume that there is no fixed cost of production. In section 
4, we will examine the implications of fixed cost and entry cost on our results. 
We assume that the inverse market demand function is given by 
 
) ( e i q q p p + = ,                                                            (1) 
 
where  p  is the price of the product and  i q ,  e q  are the outputs of the incumbent and the 
entrant respectively. We assume that  0 < ′ p  and  0 ≤ ′′ p . In the following analysis we use 
the subscripts i and e respectively. 
  We consider the following game. In stage 1, the incumbent decides whether to 
lobby for price-cap regulation. Then, in stage 2, the entrant decides whether to enter or 
not. In our analysis we normalize the outside option of the entrant to 0and assume that  8
the entrant will enter provided it earns a net positive profit in this market. In stage 3, 
outputs would be chosen and the profits would be realized. We assume that in case of 
entry the firms simultaneously choose their outputs in the product market like Cournot 
duopolists. If entry does not occur then only the incumbent produces in the product 
market.   
 
3.1  Market outcome under non-regulation 
In this subsection, we assume that the incumbent firm does not lobby for price-cap 
regulation. Hence, if entry occurs, the profit of the incumbent and the entrant will be 
respectively 
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where the superscript  nr signifies non-regulated, the first (second) argument in the  (.,.) π  
stands for the marginal cost of production of the incumbent (entrant) and 
*
i q , 
*
e q  are the 
optimal outputs of the incumbent and the entrant respectively. 
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where superscript m signifies monopoly. If the entrant does not enter then the incumbent 
can produce the monopoly output in the market and earns the monopoly profit. Therefore, 
the entrant will enter this market whenever 
 
0 ) , ( > − K c c e i
nr
e π .                        (4) 
 
In the following analysis we will assume that condition (4) holds. That is, the entrant will 
enter the market if the incumbent does not lobby for the price-cap regulation. Otherwise, 
the incumbent does not face a credible threat of entry because the entrant cannot make 
positive profits.   9
3.2  Market outcome under regulation 
In this subsection, we will examine the profits of these firms when the incumbent lobbies 
for price-cap regulation. We assume that incumbent firm can lobby to the regulatory body 
for an upper bound on the industry price. The incumbent, however, needs to incur a cost 
L for lobbying. We may interpret this cost of lobbying as utility created by lobbying. For 
simplicity, we assume that this cost of lobbying is fixed and does not depend on the 
degree of price regulation.  
  It is trivial to note that whenever the incumbent lobbies for the regulation, it will 
ask the regulator to impose the upper bound on the industry price, say  p , that is lower 
than the industry price charged by the firms without lobbying. That is, the regulated price 
is lower than the profit-maximizing price of these firms under duopoly. Otherwise, 
lobbying has no impact on the market outcome. Further, it is clear that the incumbent will 
not lobby for any regulated price lower than  i c . Because, then, the incumbent will not be 
able to earn a positive profit. Therefore, the regulatory price should be between  i c  and 
the profit-maximizing price under unregulated duopoly.  
  Since the regulated price is lower than the profit-maximizing price under duopoly, 
the industry output would correspond to the total demand at the regulated price. If entry 
occurs then the incumbent and the entrant will share the industry demand between them. 
The profit of these firms, however, will depend on the way they share the industry output. 
One reasonable procedure might be to consider that these firms would share the outputs 
according to their relative market share under unregulated duopoly and we will assume 







+ = . This sharing rule is similar to the 
‘proportional reduction technology’ defined in Schmalensee (1987). Our basic result will 
not be influenced  by a different rule for market sharing under regulation. However, if the 
entrant does not enter then the incumbent will produce the total output corresponding to 
the regulated price. 
Therefore, if entry occurs, then, under regulation, the entrant and the incumbent 
share the market as under unregulated duopoly but produce at a price, which is different 
from the profit-maximizing price under unregulated duopoly. This immediately implies 
  10
that the net profit of the entrant would be lower under regulation compared to non-
regulation.
1 
  The profit of the entrant under lobbying, constrained by the regulatory price, is 
given by 
 
} ) , ( , 0 { K c c Max e i
r
e − π ,                       (5) 
 
where  K q s c q p c c e e e i
r
e − − = ) ) ( ( ) , ( π . If the net profit of the entrant under the regulatory 
regime is lower than the entry cost then the entrant would not enter the market and would 
receive zero profit. 
  The effect of regulation on the production of the incumbent, however, depends on 
the entry decision of the entrant. The profit of the incumbent under regulation is given by  
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or,  L q c q p L c i i
r
i − − = − ) ) ( ( ) ( π    when  0 ) , ( < − K c c e i
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e π .           (7) 
 
If entry occurs then the incumbent shares the industry output with the entrant and 
following the similar logic provided for the entrant, here the profit of the incumbent will 
be lower under regulation compared to non-regulation. But, if entry does not occur under 
regulation, then the incumbent would serve the total market. Hence, in this situation, the 
incumbent would act as a monopolist but constrained by the regulatory price. It is easy to 
check from (6) and (7) that for any regulated price, the profit of the incumbent is higher 
when the entrant does not enter compared to a situation when the entrant enters the 
market. Since the regulated price is lower than the price under non-regulation, it is 
                                                           
1 From the first order condition for profit maximization, it could be argued that 
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where  e s  is the entrant’s market share under regulation and q is the industry output under regulated price 
p.    11
intuitive to argue that the incumbent will not lobby for a price which is lower than the 
price that prevents entry. 
   Therefore if regulation does not prevent entry, then the incumbent earns a lower 
profit under regulation compared to non-regulation. Hence, the incumbent will have the 
incentive to lobby for regulation only if regulation prevents entry. 
  
Lemma 1: For any cost of lobbying, the incumbent will lobby for regulation only if 
regulation prevents entry. In this case, the price under regulation will be equal to the 
price that prevents entry. 
 
3.3  Decision on lobbying for regulation 
In the last subsection we have seen that the incumbent has no incentive to lobby for 
regulation when regulation does not prevent entry. However, under regulation, the 
incumbent earns a higher profit under non-entry by the entrant compared to entry. In this 
subsection we will examine whether the profit of the incumbent under lobbying and non-
entry by the entrant could be more compared to non-regulation. 
   From (2) and (7) we find that the incumbent’s profit under regulation would be 
greater than that under non-regulation provided 
 
L q c q q p q c p i i e i i > − + − −
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From condition (8), it is clear that the left hand side (LHS) of (8) is positive at 
* p p =  but negative at  i c p = . The LHS of (8) is monotonically increasing in  p  over 
] , [
* p ci . Hence, the LHS of (8) is positive if the regulated price is not sufficiently lower 
than 
* p . Therefore, we find that the incumbent will never lobby for regulation if the 
regulated price, which is necessary to prevent entry, is sufficiently lower than the non-
regulated price. Further, the critical regulated price that makes the incumbent indifferent 
between regulation and non-regulation increases with the costs of lobbying.   12
Like the incumbent, the gross profit of the entrant under regulation, i.e.,  ) ( K
r
e + π  
also increases monotonically over  ] , [
* p ci .  Thus, we see that the amount of price 
reduction that is necessary to prevent entry reduces with higher entry cost. So, as the entry 
cost increases, it increases the net profit of the incumbent under regulation compared to 
non-regulation and makes lobbying for regulation more likely.  
Next, consider the effects of marginal costs on the likelihood of lobbying. Define 
the LHS of (8) by  X , i.e., 
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If  i e c c ≥  we find that the LHS of (9) is negative as  q qi <
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Therefore, we find that if the incumbent is not (marginal) cost efficient compared to the  
entrant then the benefit from lobbying increases as the incumbent becomes more cost 
efficient and hence, the incentive for lobbying increases. 
If  e i c c <  then 
i c
q
i e c c ∂
∂ − ) (  is positive in (9) and the difference  ) (
* q qi −  reduces 
with lower value of  i c . However, since the LHS of (9) is continuous in  i c  and we have 
already seen that the LHS of negative at  e i c c = , we can say that the incumbent’s 
incentive for lobbying increases even when the incumbent is cost efficient compared to 
the entrant. 
Let us now consider the effect of the marginal cost of production of the entrant. If 
the marginal cost of the entrant reduces then the profit of the incumbent under non-
regulation reduces. The lower the marginal cost of the entrant, however, the more 
difficult it is relatively to prevent entry and hence the lower the regulated price needs to 
be. This will lower the profit of the incumbent under regulation. Since, we need to lower 
the regulated price further compared to the profit maximizing price under duopoly, it is 
   13
more likely that the lower the marginal cost of the entrant the less is the gain from 
regulation and hence, the lower the incentive for lobbying. 
  
We find that  0 >=< ∂
∂
e c
X  as 
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It is easy to check that the LHS of (10) is positive if the marginal cost of the entrant is 
sufficiently lower than the marginal cost of the incumbent, i.e.,  e i c c >> . This implies 
that, in this situation, the gain from lobbying reduces with the lower marginal cost of the 
entrant. Hence, here the incumbent has a lower incentive to lobby for regulation. 
If the marginal cost of the incumbent is sufficiently lower than the marginal cost 
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2
. For these values of  i c  and  e c , the values of both K , given by the 
positive profit condition for the entrant under non-regulation, and 
*
e q  are very small and 
the sign of the LHS depends on the sign of  ) (
* *
2 ′
+ p q K e .  So, even in this situation, the 
incentive for regulation may be lower as the entrant becomes more cost efficient.   
The following proposition summarizes the above discussions. 
 
Proposition 1: (a) The likelihood of lobbying for regulation increases with a higher entry 
cost and a lower cost of lobbying. 
(b) (i) If the marginal cost of the incumbent is not lower than the marginal cost of the 
entrant then the incentive for lobbying increases with the lower marginal cost of the 
incumbent. 
(ii) If the marginal cost of the incumbent is lower than the marginal cost of the entrant, 
the incentive for lobbying may still increase with the lower marginal cost of the 
incumbent.  14
(c) The incentive for lobbying is likely to be reduced with a lower marginal cost of the 
entrant. 
  
3.4 An  example 
In this subsection we provide an example for the conditions obtaining in Proposition 1. 
Let us consider that the inverse market demand function is linear and is given by 
q a p − = . 
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π . The entrant’s profit under non-regulation will be 
positive if 
9
) 2 ( e i c c a + −  - K > 0.    
  Regulation will prevent entry when the price under regulation reduces to a price 
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incumbent has the incentive to lobby for regulation when the incumbent and the entrant 
has same marginal cost of production. 
  In Figures 1 and 2 we show the effects of different marginal costs of production 
for the incumbent and entrant respectively.
 2 In Figure 1 we consider a numerical example 
with  1 = a , 49 . = e c ,  00004 . = K  and  0 = L . Given these values of the parameters, we 
plot the LHS of (13) for  ] , 0 [ 2
49 . 1 ∈ i c  in Figure 1.  This value of K  ensures that the entrant 
earns a positive profit under non-regulation. 
From Figure 1, it is clear that if  i c  is less than a critical value then lobbying for 
regulation is the profitable strategy to the incumbent. In fact, we find in Figure 1 that the 
incumbent has the incentive to lobby for regulation only if the marginal cost of the 
incumbent is lower than the marginal cost of the entrant. Hence, it shows that we can 
expect lobbying for regulation in those industries where the incumbent firm is relatively 
cost efficient. This is a surprising finding given that it is usually inefficient firms which 
are expected to lobby for protection against competition. 
 
 
                                                           
2 We use ‘Mathematica 4’ for Figures 1 and 2.  16










Figure 1: Left hand side of (13) for  1 = a , 49 . = e c ,  ] , 0 [ 2
49 . 1 ∈ i c , 00004 . = K  and  0 = L . 








Figure 2: Left hand side of (13) for  1 = a , 49 . = i c ,  ] , 0 [ 2
4 . 1 ∈ e c ,  0007 . = K  and  0 = L .  
 
  In Figure 2, we consider a different scenario to show the effects of different 
marginal costs of the entrant. We consider the following values for the parameters:  1 = a , 
49 . = i c ,  0 = L ,  0007 . = K . Given these values of the parameters, we plot the LHS of 
(13) for  ] , 0 [ 2
4 . 1 ∈ e c  in Figure 2. We find that the incumbent has the incentive to lobby for 
regulation provided the entrant is sufficiently cost inefficient. Therefore, one would 
expect lobbying for regulation in those industries where the entrants are relatively 
inefficient – again a surprising and counter-intuitive finding. This small value of K  
ensures that the entrant earns a positive profit under non-regulation.  17
4 Multiple  incumbents 
In the previous section, we have considered is the case of one incumbent in the market. 
The purpose of this section is to examine how the analysis would be affected when we 
have more than one incumbent in the market. In particular, in this section we will 
consider a situation with two symmetric incumbents and one entrant. We denote these 
incumbents by  1 i  and  2 i . Further, to make the threat of entry credible we assume that the 
entrant’s net profit is positive when there is no regulation. Therefore, in case of non-
regulation, the profits of the ith incumbent and the entrant are given by 
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where,  2 , 1 = m  and the first two arguments in the  (.,.,.) π  function is for the marginal cost 
of the two incumbents and the third argument is for the marginal cost of the entrant.  
  
4.1 Non-cooperative  lobbying 
In this subsection we consider that the incumbent decides on lobbying non-cooperatively. 
In the next subsection, we will consider the possibility of cooperative lobbying. 
We consider the following game. In stage 1, the incumbents simultaneously 
decide whether to lobby for regulation or not. Then, in stage 2, the firms choose their 
outputs simultaneously, conditional on the decision of the first stage, and profits are 
realized. 
If any of these incumbents wants to lobby for regulation, it requires that the firm 
incurs a disutility of L. In the previous section, we have shown that the incumbent will 
lobby for regulation only if regulation prevents entry. Following the similar argument, we 
can say that, in case of multiple incumbents also, neither incumbent will lobby for 
regulation if regulation does not prevent entry. Lobbying for regulation by any of these 
incumbents can reduce the price of the product to a level that prevents entry. Therefore, 
when the incumbents decide whether to lobby or not, their payoffs are given by the 
following payoff table.  18
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Table1: Net payoffs of the incumbents  
 
  From Table 1, it is clear that (Lobbying, Lobbying) is never an equilibrium for any 
positive cost of lobbying. If an incumbent lobbies for regulation then the other incumbent 
does not have the incentive for lobbying since the incumbent who is doing lobbying can 
generate the desired outcome of regulation. (Lobbying, lobbying) could be the Nash 
equilibrium in case of zero cost of lobbying. 
  Further, it is easy to check that neither of these incumbents has the incentive for 
lobbying when the cost of lobbying is sufficiently high, i.e., when 
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we find that there are two pure strategy equilibria such as (Lobbying, Not lobbying) and 
(Not lobbying, Lobbying). In a purely non-cooperative set up this possibility can lead to a 
coordination problem between the incumbents. This coordination problem can generate a 
situation, which is similar to the mixed strategy equilibrium. 
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im c c c c c L π π − =  and for  0 = L  we have  1 = θ .  We consider that for these 
costs of lobbying, the incumbents play the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Hence,  19
there is a positive probability that neither of the incumbents will lobby for the regulation 
and entry will not be prevented.  
Since lobbying by any one of these incumbents can generate the desired result for 
the incumbents, each of these incumbents has the incentive for not lobbying when the 
other incumbent lobbies. This possibility may encourage each of the incumbents to free 
ride on the other incumbent. This free riding will benefit the free rider by saving the cost 
of lobbying but getting the benefit of lobbying. As a result, there is a positive probability 
that both firms will try to free ride and neither of them will lobby for regulation. 
This fear of free riding by both firms may also encourage both firms to choose 
lobbying for regulation and hence, it may lead to a situation of over investment on 
lobbying. There is a positive probability that both incumbents will lobby for regulation. 
The following proposition summarizes the above discussions. 
 
Proposition 2: (a) A free rider problem may arise when the costs of lobbying are not 




im > − ) , , ( ) , ( π π . As a result, there is a positive 
probability that neither of the incumbents lobbies for regulation and entry is not deterred, 
even if lobbying is profitable to each of these firms compared to situation with no 
lobbying at all. 




im > − ) , , ( ) , ( π π , we may also observe over investment in lobbying. 
 
4.2  Cooperation in lobbying 
In the above analysis we have seen that when there are multiple incumbents then there 
can be a coordination problem between the firms at the lobbying stage. This coordination 
problem may encourage the incumbents to cooperate in lobbying. 
  At this point it is worth mentioning that this type of cooperation in lobbying for 
regulation may be difficult to sustain since this type of agreement may not be accepted by 
the court of law, since such lobbying is aimed at preventing the entry of new firms. 
Agreements may therefore be non-enforceable and therefore open up the possibility of 
cheating.. This situation could be even worse if the disutility from lobbying is non-
verifiable. However, cheating by a firm from any co-operative agreement may create a  20
significant fall in reputation among the other firms in the industry. This reputation effect 
may deter cheating and thus help these firms to sustain co-operation in lobbying. In the 
following analysis we will assume that the firms can make a credible agreement for 
lobbying. 
We extend the game in the following way. In stage 1, these firms decide whether 
to go for co-operate in lobbying or not. If they do opt for cooperation then one of these 
firms will lobby and both firms will share the cost of lobbying equally. If they do not co-
operate then, in stage 2, the incumbents decide on lobbying non-co-operatively. In stage 
3, the outputs of the firms would be chosen and profits would be realized.  
If, in stage 1, the incumbent decide that they will not cooperate in lobbying then 
the analysis will be similar to the subsection 3.1. If the incumbents, in stage 1, decide to 





c c i i
r
im − π .
3                       (15) 
 
  Now we are in a position to decide whether the incumbents would prefer co-
operation in lobbying or not. 
  First, consider the situation where the costs of lobbying are sufficiently high so 
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We see that here each of these incumbents prefers cooperative lobbying as long as we 
have 
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So, here cooperative lobbying agreements are preferable to non-co-operative lobbying.  
Reducing the cost of lobbying for each of the incumbents creates the incentive for such 
cooperation.  
                                                           
3 We have already noted that whenever the incumbents lobby for regulation, they will ask for a regulated 
price that would prevent entry. This argument holds also if the incumbents cooperate for lobbying.  21
  Next, we consider the situation, where the costs of lobbying are not sufficiently 




im > − ) , , ( ) , ( π π . Here, under non-co-operative lobbying, the 
incumbents will randomise between lobbying and not lobbying with a probability θ  and 
) 1 ( θ −  respectively (see subsection 3.1). Therefore, for these costs of lobbying, each 
incumbent will prefer co-operation in lobbying compared to non-co-operation in lobbying 
provided 
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The condition (17) is always positive for these costs of lobbying. Hence, we have the 
following proposition. 
 
Proposition 3: If co-operation in lobbying is possible then the incumbents will always 
prefer co-operation in lobbying compared to non-co-operation. 
 
5  Lobbying by the Entrant 
So far we have assumed that in the face of possible lobbying by the incumbent for 
regulation, the entrant does not lobby against regulation. This is not an unreasonable 
assumption if the entrant is a foreign firm and has little knowledge of domestic 
institutions and therefore for whom the cost of lobbying is possibly prohibitive. However, 
even in the case of a foreign firm, it is possible for this knowledge to be acquired, the cost 
of doing so being part of the fixed costs of lobbying. In lobbying against regulation, the 
entrant’s objective is to get the market outcome under non-regulation. The questions are 
then first, under what conditions an entrant will lobby; and secondly, what is the best 
strategy for an incumbent to employ in the face of possible lobbying by the entrant.
4 For 
                                                           
4 There is the further possibility that a foreign firm could lobby through a domestic partner. Such a 
possibility is implicit in our analysis.  22
simplicity we shall assume that the costs of lobbying are the same for both incumbent and 
entrant. 
  We consider the following game with a single incumbent and an entrant. In stage 
1, both the incumbent and the entrant simultaneously decide to lobby. Then, in stage 2, 
the entrant decides whether to enter or not. In stage 3, outputs would be chosen and the 
profits would be realized. As before we solve the game through backward induction.  
  The firms will face the following payoff table when taking the decision in stage 1. 
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Table 2: Net payoffs of the incumbent and the entrant when both lobby. 
 
  When neither incumbent nor entrant lobby, then net profits are the same as the 
market outcome under non-regulation (see subsection 3.1). When only the incumbent 
lobbies, and lobbying is optimal
5, then the payoffs are the same as the market outcome 
under regulation (see subsection 3.2).  When the incumbent is not lobbying and the 
entrant is lobbying, then the market outcome is similar to the former case except that the 
entrant incurs lobbying cost, L. Finally, if both lobby, then we assume that with 
probability, p (1-p), the incumbent’s (entrant’s) lobbying will be successful and hence 
deter (cannot deter) entry.  
  From Table 2 it is clear that when the incumbent is not lobbying it is not optimal 
for the entrant to lobby. Given that the entrant is not lobbying it is always optimal for the 
incumbent to lobby since we assume that lobbying is optimal to the incumbent when the  23
entrant is not lobbying. Given that the incumbent is lobbying, the entrant has the 
incentive to lobby provided (1-p) ( ) c , c ( e i
nr
e π -K) > L
6.  If p is close to 1 then the left 
hand of the inequality will tend to zero and hence the entrant has no incentive for 




e π − , then it is not optimal for the 
entrant to lobby, given that the incumbent is lobbying, and hence the equilibrium is 
(Lobbying, Not Lobbying).  




e π − , then it is optimal for the entrant to lobby given 
that the incumbent is lobbying. Therefore, if the entrant lobbies then the incumbent will 
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  Let is first consider the situation where L is sufficiently low. If L is sufficiently 
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e π −  then both firms will lobby in equilibrium. 






i π π −  then we find that it is optimal for the entrant to 
lobby when the incumbent lobbies. But, given that the entrant is lobbying, it is not 
optimal for the incumbent to lobby. However, we have already seen that if the incumbent 
does not lobby then it is optimal for the entrant not to lobby and when the entrant does 
not lobby then it is optimal for the incumbent to lobby. Thus, it is clear that if L and p are 
                                                                                                                                                                             
5 We assume that the conditions for optimal lobbying are as given in (8) in subsection 3.3.  24
sufficiently low then there is no pure strategy equilibrium, but there will be mixed 
strategy equilibrium of the lobbying game. Hence, in this situation, the incumbent and the 
entrant will optimally randomize between lobbying and not lobbying. 
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e π −  then following the argument of the previous paragraph, we 
can say that in this situation the lobbying game will have a mixed strategy equilibrium 
where the incumbent and the entrant will optimally randomize between lobbying and not 
lobbying. 
  The following proposition summarizes the above discussion. 
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lobbying and not lobbying. 
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e π −  then both firms will optimally randomize between 
lobbying and not lobbying. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                             
6 We assume that the sum of entry and lobbying costs is less than the entrant’s profit under non-regulation.  25
6 Conclusion 
 
We have shown here that it is possible to conceive of a situation in which it is more 
profitable for incumbents to lobby governments to institute regulation by price-capping 
than it is in the absence of regulation. We have considered both situations where there is 
one incumbent and where there is more than one incumbent. In the first case it pays the 
incumbent to lobby for regulation as long as the regulated price deters entry. In the second 
case it also pays the incumbents to lobby as long as they all lobby individually (i.e. no-
one free rides) or they co-operate in lobbying without any incentive to cheat. We have 
also considered the situation in which the entrant can lobby. Here we found that the 
decision to lobby will depend on the cost of doing so and on the probability of securing a 
successful outcome.  
Of course we have assumed a political institutional framework in which 
governments accept to be lobbied.  Firms may exert influence through politicians in 
constituencies where incumbents might be threatened by entry, through donations to 
political parties, or through appointments of influential ex-politicians to their boards of 
directors. Governments may be unwilling to risk the closure of incumbent firms because 
of the effects on employment and the regional/national economy. Price-capping 
regulation sought by incumbents constitutes a way in which the interests of incumbents 
can be protected without resort to protectionist policies. In allowing for the possibility of 
lobbying by entrants, we are also assuming that channels may exist for governments to be 
influenced by new players, and especially foreign investors.  
The dilemma for policy makers is whether allowing price-capping protectionism 
is likely in the longer-run to lead to prices higher than they would be under open 
competition, as well as lead to a lower level of research and development by incumbent 
firms than would obtain under such competition. A further issue relates to different forms 
of entry. We have assumed here that entry is only possible through FDI. However, 
competition can also take place through trade, where the set up costs for foreign firms 
will be considerably lower than in the case of FDI. Future work will model dynamically 
R&D behaviour as well as price-capping behaviour in a competitive trade framework.  26
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